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The Korean development experience presents a successful transition from 
‘learning-by-doing’ to ‘learning-by-research’. In his book, Professor Kim explores 
the dynamics of the Korean companies’ technological learning acquisition for 
technological capability. His main conclusion is that in spite of the favourable impact 
of public policy and cultural environment, private industry made Korea’s ambitious 
development goals a reality. 
To analyse learning at Korean firms, Professor Kim has applied four 
analytical frameworks. The first framework analyses the technological strategy along 
dynamically changing technological trajectories. At the specific state of trajectory, it 
may be relatively easy for catching-up firms to acquire mature foreign technologies, 
which might be generally available for them to imitate freely or to purchase at a 
bargain price from foreign suppliers. Rapid industrialisation usually pushes up 
wages, resulting in the rapid erosion of competitiveness. Consequently, catching-up 
firms have to compete against advanced countries by creatively adding values on 
mature products or entering the transition state through enhanced technological 
efforts. The second framework examines the institutional environment that provides 
both domestic and international ‘sources of technological learning’. The third 
framework theorises the dynamic learning process at the firm level when a 
successful firm continues through a spiral process of conversions between explicit 
and tacit knowledge. To this end, the existing knowledge base and the intensity of 
efforts are important ingredients in learning. Cumulative learning takes place through 
learning-by-doing, but discontinuous learning takes place in crisis. Effective learning 
firms construct a crisis (by setting ambitious targets) intentionally to develop 
organisational systems and manage their processes to make the crises truly creative. 
The final framework categorises major modes of technology transfer. The mode of 
transfer is determined largely by a buyer’s absorptive capability. If the buyer has 
sufficient capability, it can effectively acquire foreign technology without transaction 
costs and produce knockoffs and clones through reverse-engineering. 
The industrialisation strategies of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s were largely 
associated with duplicative imitations (knockoffs or clones of mature foreign 
products), with foreign brand names at significantly lower prices. In the 1980s and 
1990s, Korean industries were stretching their activities to transform themselves into 
innovators as well as effectively creative imitators. This involves intensified in-house 
research and development (R&D) activities and participation in global alliances. 
Kim attributes Korea’s rapid technological learning to the complex 
interactions of diverse factors: (1) the government’s orchestrating role in directing 
chaebols (conglomerates) and selectively allocating resources to them to achieve 
ambitious growth objectives in the early years, and its supporting role in lowering 
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corporate R&D costs; (2) entrepreneurs’ can-do spirit exercised freely under 
restricted equity participation of multinationals; (3) chaebols that have advantages in 
mobilising resources for technological learning; (4) well-trained, hardworking 
humans who were willing to learn; (5) the continuous inflow of foreign technology 
through formal and informal mechanisms to facilitate learning; (6) competitive 
stimuli from the export market; (7) high increases in R&D investment, particularly in 
the private sector; and (8) government-imposed crises and top management-
constructed crises as a major means to expedite technological learning in catching-
up.  
The Korean experience suggests that a strong government, with competent 
technocrats and economic advisers, is an essential condition in the early stage of 
industrialisation for the economy to get off the ground. Government programmes can 
not be effective without the presence of competitive firms. For example, a restrictive 
technology transfer policy worked well in Korea at the beginning only because there 
were independent-minded entrepreneurs and a relatively well-educated workforce 
determined to expedite technological learning through a reverse-engineering process. 
The export market is open to all catching-up countries but only a few can take 
advantage because only a small number can develop the technological ability to tap 
it. Even crisis imposition or construction cannot lead to creative learning; it would be 
a disaster were it not for entrepreneurs and their hardworking labour force. Here, 
socio-cultural factors (the Confucian heritage) and education shape the mind-set and 
skills of people involved in the economy. 
The successful story of Korea’s technological learning highlights the fact that 
it was made possible due to an effective national innovation system, one that is an 
interactive, and therefore socially-embedded, complex process of diverse formal and 
informal institutions within the situational and cultural contexts of a nation-state. A 
system that has an array of well-balanced public programmes which create an 
economic environment conducive to the smooth inflow of foreign technology is in 
place and reduces the cost of technological learning, and is also competitive enough 
to force firms to expedite learning. The system has caused productive interaction not 
only between government programmes and the private sector but also between 
suppliers and buyers. Here, socio-cultural factors such as moral and social norms, 
customs, and traditions that shape habits and routines in an interactive learning 
process have been as important as formal institutions such as rules, laws, government 
agencies, banks, and technical support systems. 
It may not be easy for a country like Pakistan to follow the Korean 
development path because the economic environment after the establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) is so different, especially due to the agreements 
on trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), trade-related intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS) and Services, and the protectionist policies in the developed countries 
that will hamper an export-oriented strategy. Nevertheless, Korea’s technological 
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learning has important implications for a technology-recipient country. In short, the 
availability of local entrepreneurs, successful crisis construction and management, 
and the capability of local engineers and technicians are important to boost firm-
level technological learning. At the national level, government policies on trade, 
foreign technology transfer, market structure, financial institutions, education, and 
socio-cultural factors are important. Foreign technology transfer should not be seen 
as a substitute for in-house efforts. Rather, the two strategies should be 
complementary. Transfer of technology provides new dimensions in raising 
knowledge levels and serves as a catalyst for technological change. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) does not necessarily transfer innovation capability, particularly 
when the parent company uses FDI, or a joint venture, to exploit the local market. 
Packaged foreign licences from a single source involve little risk to the recipient, as 
the supplier guarantees the performance of the transferred technology. However, it 
leads to the recipient’s adopting a passive attitude towards the learning process. But 
when the recipient acquires technologies from multiple sources, and assumes 
responsibility for integrating them into a workable system, the process entails a 
major risk. This constructs a crisis, which forces and then motivates the recipient to 
expedite technological learning. For the recipient with adequate tacit knowledge, it is 
better to follow this path. 
In the domain of public policy, Kim recommends proactive measures to 
provide quality secondary and tertiary education to a country’s populace, while the 
government should assume a decisive role in guiding an economy to create market 
competition. 
For corporate management, the suggested line of action includes creative 
imitation through search, observation, and assimilation of new knowledge and 
translation into creative new products and systems; tapping of multiple sources of 
foreign technologies; continuous up-gradation of the tacit knowledge embodied in 
human resources; continuous investment in R&D efforts to work on imported 
technologies; and monitoring of  technological changes in advanced countries.  
This book provides a very useful analysis of Korea’s successful experience of 
transforming the economy from a producer of imitative products to a producer of 
technology-intensive products. It is highly recommended here to academics, policy-
makers, and business managers. 
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